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Abstract 
 
Summary: The ubiquity of business has subsequently led to the worldwide 
expansion of Corporate Governance (CG). As the future and its 
contingencies put pressures on companies, scholars try to explain certain 
phenomenon and scrutinize them. Corporate Governance has throughout 
time been heavily investigated, primarily focusing on the agency 
theories, and more recently, stewardship and other multi-dimensional 
theories for answers. However, on the flipside, other paths of CG have 
been somewhat neglected. One of these is the Board Formation and 
Board Composition. By devising a research model including theories 
pertinent to the latter we intend to investigate the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the University Spin-Off (USO) setting in moreover 
irrefutably under-stimulated of scholarly attention in regard to 
aforementioned board matters. Thus, by combining the two in a Swedish 
setting and by conducting a qualitative case study approach, we hope to 
shed new light upon the conundrum. What we found was that the Board 
Formation/Composition to a large extent follows the theories and model 
that we proposed in our work, thus giving it academic and scholarly 
credibility and validity in our setting. Furthermore, individuals are added 
via the social and personal networks of existing personnel because they 
offer resources and/or competencies that the venture is lacking and needs 
in order to progress. However, no decisive evidence was found in regard 
to if the selection of individuals to the board varied over its Firm Life-
Cycle. 
Title: Board Formation in University Spin-Offs – A qualitative study on board 
formation and changes in a Swedish context 
Course:  Bachelor Thesis – Business Administration, Management 
Authors:  Gustaf Bernander & Victor Bördin 
Research question(s): How and why are specific individuals selected as board members in 
USO’s? 
Does the selection of board members vary depending on what stage in 
the life-cycle the firm is in?   
  
Purpose: Board Formation and Composition in a University Spin-Off setting is sill 
an academic phenomenon that has received relatively low scholarly 
glances. Furthermore, in the context of Sweden more light has yet to be 
shed upon the conundrum. As a result of the following we have decided 
to embark on a sojourn where we explore the former and the latter in a 
qualitative manner and juxtaposing it to relevant theory. 
Abbreviations: University Spin-Off (USO), Venture Capitalist (VC), Corporate 
Governance (CG), Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), Social Network 
Theory (SNT), Life-Cycle Theory of a University Spin-Off (LCT) 
Definitions: (1) Board Formation: how the board of the company in question is 
formed; who sits on the board, how has he come about and why is he 
there are common questions related to the formation. (2) USO: A 
University Spin-Off is a venture that has committed to transform 
technological inventions developed from university research that are 
likely to remain unexploited otherwise. Further, they have committed to 
the development as a part of their university education, and post-
graduation continued to work with the venture. 
Target group: University Spin-Offs operating in a Swedish context 
Focus group: Start-up firms with similar backgrounds as the ones presented in this 
study; thus High-Tech Spin-Offs 
Theoretical perspectives: We have compiled existing academia with emphasis on corporate 
governance and more specifically on Boards in an USO setting. Most 
prominently, we have focused on applying the work of Björnåli & 
Gulbrandsen (2010), but also theories such as RDT, SNT and LCT 
Methodology: The study includes a qualitative approach in which we collected our 
empirical data through interviews 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Sweden, University Spin-Offs, Board Formation, 
Board Composition, Selection Antecedents  
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1. Introduction  
The following introductory chapter presents a background discussion and a problem 
discussion. Ultimately, we intend to describe the phenomenon of corporate governance and 
elucidate its entailments. From this, we then dwell into the paradigm and discover that board 
formation in University spin-offs in a Swedish context is where we wish to research within 
the corporate governance field, which ultimately constitutes our purpose and research 
questions. 
1.1 Background 
Corporate governance and all that it incorporates has been one of the most prominent and 
ever-recurring topics within the realm of academia and its importance has its roots in the 
corporate scandals that come and go throughout time (Jacksén & Pettersen, 2012).  In recent 
years, the spotlight for governance issues has somewhat shifted towards banks and financial 
institutions, due to the surfacing of and their subsequent involvement in financial crises. 
However, as Shleifer & Vishny (1997) point out, the subject of corporate governance is of 
imperative nature due to its direct relationship with corporate practice; thus conducting 
research within the area is attractive as it explores practical importance.  
However, with the plethora of corporate governance studies, ranging from Berle & Means 
(1932) to Jensen & Meckling (1976) to Lynall et al. (2003) highlights the interest of corporate 
governance throughout time within academia. Based in the latter, it is therefore imperative to 
elaborate on what defines the various activities within the corporate governance discourse. 
Dalton et al. (2003: 371) state that the definition is usually aligned with the following: “the 
primary focus on the control of executive self-interest and the protection of shareholder 
interests in a setting where organizational ownership and control are separated.”; Where 
much interest is subsequently connected to the efficacy of various mechanisms at disposal to 
protect the shareholder from self-interested and whimsical executives. 
As a result, within the realm of academia, agency theory, has been one of the most ubiquitous 
underpinnings when elucidating corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Dalton et 
al., 2003), where, as Filatotchev et al. (2006) argue that the agency theory application has 
tended to be directed towards large mature companies listed on a stock market, thus ultimately 
receiving the “lion’s share” of attention of academic scholars; optimal corporate governance 
consensus is based on large and mature corporations. This theory postulates and elaborates on 
the inherent issues that arise when ownership and control are separated. Often, the corporation 
is reduced to active participants, namely the managers and the shareholder. According to 
agency theorists, one of most common and central actions is the board’s oversight monitoring 
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of the executives; this to provide shareholder with assurance and protection of their interests, 
as this situation creates an opening conducive to managerial opportunism (Dalton et al. 2003; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al. 1996; Walsh & Seward, 1990). As a result, the board 
is commonly responsible for key oversight functions that include: hiring, firing and 
compensating CEO’s and for overall effective organizational functioning (Dalton et al. 2003; 
Blair & Stout, 2001). Thus, conclusively, the board could be seen as “the apex of the internal 
control system” (Jensen, 1993:862).  
Although agency theory has been the dominant theoretical inception for research, there is an 
array of other theoretical bodies that provide insights and alternative approaches for corporate 
governance studies. At the same time studies such as Faleye et al. (2011) show a decline in 
firm performance derived from costly monitoring results undertaken by a high number of 
independent directors, as these actions crowd out the strategic dimension of the board. 
Therefore, it has become lucrative to, as previously postulated, find alternative foci. Here, 
theoretical perspectives such as Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and 
Stewardship Theory (Davis et al., 1997) are areas with future potential. Although these areas 
have been researched for a considerable amount of time (referring to the years) they have 
been undermined and quasi-neglected due to the prominence and surge of agency theory. 
Resource Dependence Theory has its inception in the director’s resource role and see the 
board members contributions as boundary spanners of the organization and its environment; 
therefore outside directors are allocated and recruited as they provide access to resources that 
are sought after by the firm, which ultimately might enhance functioning, performance or 
even survival (Pfeffer & Salanciik, 1978; Dalton et al. 2003; Dalton et al. 1999). Stewardship 
theory, argues that executives and directors often have isomorphic interests with those of the 
shareholder, which is in contrast to agency theory who sees executives and directors as 
opportunistic and self-serving (Davis et al. 1997). However, the theory does not argue that 
executives and directors are altruistic in their nature; instead the mere recognition that in 
many situations executives can serve their own interests by serving the shareholders’ interests 
(Lane et al. 1998). 
All the elaborated perspectives of corporate governance presented so far can be seen as quasi-
static, this as they do not articulate the time parameter. In response to this, researchers have 
turned attention to excavating and identifying factors that might explain how corporate 
governance is affected over time. This shift to a more dynamic approach incorporates changes 
in the industry, in the size of the firm, volatility of performance, sales growth and other 
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variables of contingency which have been enunciated in literature (Jacksén & Pettersen, 
2012).  
One line of research has embarked and undertaken to investigate these contingency factors in 
relation to corporate governance, namely: firm-life cycle theory. Within this line of research, 
academics have focused on the different changes that corporations undergo and undertake in 
relation to their corporate governance structure as they enter a new life-cycle phase: this as a 
new phase requires different needs (Filatotchev et al. 2006). Prior research on corporate 
governance structures have in specific, in contrast, focused on the power of the CEO (Harjoto 
& Hoje, 2009), board independence (Lynall et al. 2003), board monitoring-intensity by board 
over executives (Vafaes, 1999) and the board’s work (Huse & Zattoni, 2008).  
As previously iterated, much of the literature has primarily focused on large and mature firms, 
which deductively would lead one to postulate that smaller firms, such as entrepreneurial 
firms and other SME’s have been, in comparison, neglected by academia. In unison with the 
latter, Daily et al. (2002) try to investigate governance in entrepreneurial firms, this as they 
argue there extant research has only provided little evidence in the case and the 
entrepreneurial setting provides a venue where the impact of governance structures and 
strategic leadership are most likely to be evident. After providing a synthesis of the 
entrepreneurship literature relevant to the CEO/Founder, the Board, the Venture Capital they 
come to the conclusion that extant research is suggestive, at best, but is not applicable in the 
entrepreneurial setting, this as a constant and consistent theme within the research is a relative 
dearth. Thus, the relationship between governance/strategic leadership variables, exempli 
gratia, CEO/Founder, the Board, the Venture Capital and firm performance is an opportunity 
lost (Daily et al. 2002).  
Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a substantial rise in the creation of university 
spin-off companies (Siegel et al, 2003b). The commercialization of these university activities 
has become a key point on universities’ and governments’ agenda (Wright et al. 2006).  
However, research in regard to corporate governance and university spin-offs is scarce, but 
Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) have attempted to shed some light upon the conundrum.  
From the aforementioned, it is evident that the realm of corporate governance has been a 
highly lucrative endeavor for academia throughout a considerable amount of years. As it has 
been postulated, different approaches have been utilized by academics when conducting 
governance research such as: Agency theory, Resource Dependence Theory and Stewardship 
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theory. Imperative to stress is that these approaches are in no way the exclusives ones; 
however we argue that their prominence reflects their popularity within academia, which is 
why they have been elaborated on. Ultimately, as Dalton et al. (2003) implicitly conclude, 
there seems to be a need for more research in regard to entrepreneurial settings. Also, the 
emergence of University spin-offs has tantalizingly caught our attention. Therefore we intend 
to elaborate within these settings, which will be discussed in the following section.  
1.2 Problem Discussion 
As we have previously stipulated in this study, corporate governance has been thoroughly and 
comprehensibly investigated within academia. However, we argue that research in relation to 
Sweden is in dire need of extension and therefore it is within this context we aspire to 
elaborate and conduct our research. Furthermore, continuing the delimitation, we also argue 
that the realm of University spin-offs (USO) is of enticing nature for us to figurate within; 
hence we also intend to incorporate the latter in our research. Conclusively, corporate 
governance is broad in its terminology as it incorporates a vast body of various perspectives, 
thus in order to for us to study it, we have intended to delimitate it and channelize the lion’s 
share of attention to the Selection of Board and CEO in University spin-offs, as they are the 
main characters within corporate governance studies. 
Following the discussion, since we have decided that our study shall aim to investigate 
Corporate Governance in a Swedish context, it is imperative to acknowledge certain national 
differences. Therefore, we need to address the different regulated statutory rules and practices 
connected to Swedish firms. Jacksén & Pettersen (2012) argue that the Swedish Governance 
model (see figure 1) lies on the foundation of the Swedish Company Act, which denotes that a 
company must have three different decision-making bodies including: Shareholders meeting, 
the Board of Directors and the CEO, where the Shareholders meeting is the highest ranking 
decision-making body. The owners have therefore vast influence over the organization by 
expressing their opinions on the meeting. Majority shareholders can subsequently decide 
matters of grave importance for the firm by expressing their thoughts on the Shareholders 
meeting. 
 
       
(Figure 1) 
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In unison with the previously stipulated, much of the research has investigated mature firms, 
using US firms as samples and agency theory (Huse, 2007). Drawing from the latter it is no 
surprise that conducting research on small firms, from other countries and not applying 
agency theory is of utter salience to broaden the field. Since we have snared our focus to 
Board formation of University spin-offs, what has previous research stated?  
Research into board formation in small firms has primarily focused on boards as a means for 
new firms to cope and manage external dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; George et al. 
2001; Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010). Venture capital, social exchange, social networks, 
identity and various other facets of involvement in small firm boards have been applied to 
improve our understanding of board formation and corporate governance in private firms 
(Sapienza et al. 2000; Deakins et al. 2000; Uhlander et al. 2007). Still, little attention has been 
directed towards the board of University spin-offs, which is a relatively unstudied area within 
research (Huse, 2007; Uhlander et al., 2007). According to Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) 
and Vohora et al. (2004) boards in University spin-offs are interesting to study since these 
ventures are in transition, and go through a number of different stages of activity and thus 
need to attain an wide array of different resources, capabilities, board structures and processes 
to aid in the transition between stages.  
Once a team has been selected and the imperative resources it requires have been determined, 
it is common that additional resources are allocated from outside the venture in the start-up 
phase (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010). As Lynall et al. (2003) postulate that attracting 
experienced and well-connected members to the board might be the way to go as they might 
play a critical role in assessing and accessing external resources and other variables. However 
this might be hard for scientist/entrepreneurs whose network connections are tied to peers 
within academia (Mosey & Wright, 2007). Moreover, moving the University spin-off to the 
next transitional phase might, might require more additional resources and capabilities. 
Therefore attracting new external directors to the board that can obtain and provide access to 
these additional variables might be opted for. Thus, conclusively, one might argue that as the 
firm goes through different phases, different board members are needed (Björnåli & 
Gulbrandsen, 2010; Lynall et al. 2003). 
Still, as previously argued, few studies have explicitly focused on the boards of University 
spin-offs. However, a few scholars have initiated the penetration of the conundrum. Clarysse 
et al. (2007) conducted a quantitative study the board composition in High-Tec start-ups in 
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Belgium, Filatotchev et al. (2006) studied 27 University spin-offs and provided evidence that 
as the ventures face different developmental thresholds, they obtain different external 
resources and expertise, and Vanaelst et al. (2006) focused on the board evolution in 
conjunction with legal establishment. Extracting commonalities from prior research, it is 
evident that board formation/composition may change, thus, it is imperative to acknowledge 
that further research needs to recognize the presence of change-over-time and thus, emphasize 
the life-cycle of the firm to its board autonomy. This stands in contrast to more “obsolete” 
research findings, as they, according to Björnåli & Guldbransen (2010) take a snapshot of the 
board composition at a certain fixed point and then subsequently try to link it to firm 
performance.  
Conclusively, building on the discussion provided in this section, it is clear that board 
composition/formation is an area in which research has been lacking, although it has been 
touched upon by scholars. Incorporating the latter with the notion that University spin-offs are 
interesting to conduct research within due to their nature, as previously presented, ultimately 
delineates an interesting line of research to study within. Furthermore, taking into account the 
life-cycle aspect of a firm, and the inherent changes over time that might affect the board 
composition/formation of a firm provides a more comprehensible foundation for us to utilize. 
Additionally, as we intend to operate within the context of Sweden, we intend to expand the 
research with nation contexts: as we have seen little research has been conducted, mostly 
relating to the national contextual settings of: USA, Belgium and The UK. Therefore, by 
specifically focusing on Sweden, our intention is to contribute with more findings to the field. 
Noted is that Lindholm-Dahlstrand (1997a; 1997b: 1999) has touched upon the conundrum of 
Spin-offs within the context of Gothenburg, Sweden. However, her focal point does not point 
towards boards, thus our foci diverge, which makes our purpose more academically 
legitimate. Finally, we intend to use a qualitative approach, as we argue it will draw a more 
colorful and vivid picture of the conundrum than pure quantitative approaches can attain. 
1.3 Purpose and Research Questions 
Based on the problem discussion presented above, it is clear that board formation/composition 
in University spin-offs is a phenomenon within corporate governance studies that has, so far, 
received a counterintuitively low amount of scholarly attention. Furthermore, when operating 
within the Swedish Context close to no academic contributions have had discerning outcomes. 
Interestingly, also the life-cycle perspective we argue is interesting as the University spin-off 
setting provides many cycles of change. Thus, qualitatively studying board formation in 
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USO’s over time in a Swedish context is what we intend to elaborate on; hence we formulate 
the following research questions: 
1. How and why are specific individuals selected as board members in USO’s? 
 
2. Does the selection of board members vary depending on what stage in the life-cycle 
the firm is in?   
1.4 Thesis Disposition 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
The following chapter presents the theoretical contributions that we have included in our 
research. We will provide a model, which will guide us in our research which is based on the 
work of Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010). However, other complementary work such as: 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT), Social Network Theory (SNT) and Life-Cycle Theory 
(LCT) will also be elaborated on as they are salient cornerstones in our research. 
2.1 Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
Resource Dependence Theory recognizes the possible influence external factors might have 
on organizational behavior, decisions et cetera and, even though constrained by their context, 
managers can act in certain ways to reduce environmental dependence and uncertainty 
(Hillman et al. 2009).  Commonly, RDT has been used to examine board size and 
composition as an indicator of a board’s ability to attain critical resources to the firm; where 
these actions are seen as rational organizational responses to the conditions in play in the 
external environment (Hillman et al. 2009; Pfeffer, 1972b). According to Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) directors can bring four advantages to organizations: (1) advice, counsel and 
information, (2) access to information channel between environmental contingencies and the 
company, (3) access in the form of preference to resources, and (4) legitimacy.  Kor & 
Misangyi (2008) find in their study evidence that credit the aforementioned advantages, 
especially the advice and counsel of the board to top management. Conclusively, the evidence 
is resilient and has accrued strong support for the four advantages proposed by Pfeffer & 
Salancik (1978), thus the dynamic nature of board (its changing in formation and composition 
as the external environment changes) has become normative convention  (Hillman et al. 
2009). 
2.2 Social Network Theory (SNT) 
Social Network Theory explores the social ties, personal and acquaintance networks of 
individuals and the possible benefits that can be extracted as a subsequent result. According to 
Timmons & Spinelli (2004) argue that a firm or venture has tendencies to search via the lead 
entrepreneur’s or the lead team’s personal network of acquaintances for their initial outsider 
directors. In regard to the board formation and board member selection there is an alignment 
with the previous stipulation, id est, the addition process of board members is argued to also 
be driven by actors’ social and interpersonal relations and networks (Forbes et al. 2006).  
Thus, conclusively, the implication of Social Network Theory is that new board member 
additions are recruited via the existing social networks (Westphal, 1999).  
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2.3 Life-Cycle Theory of a University Spin-Off (LCT)  
The commercialization of research through the establishment of a spin-off is something that 
takes a long time (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006).  Using the evidence provided by 
Vanaelst et al. (2006) they argue a spin-off goes through or encounters four phases of 
development: (1) research commercialization and opportunity screening, (2) the organization-
in-gestation phase, (3) proof of viability of the newly established venture, and (4) the maturity 
stage (figure 2). Furthermore, between all the stages the venture will stumble upon critical 
junctures which they have to overcome if they will continue to succeed: opportunity 
recognition, entrepreneurial commitment, credibility and sustainability (Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
stage (1) are teams that are working on a research project and have spotted and opportunity in 
the market, reached out, tried to protect their IP and/or their patent and commercialize their 
IP. Stage (2) are teams that have identified an opportunity in the market and committed to the 
creation of a spin-off. Stage (3) are teams who have legally founded a venture and have 
allocated resources necessary to development of the spin-off. Finally, stage (4) are teams who 
have proven viability and built up maturity and sustainability. Thus, enabling credibility 
outside the academic/scientific realm and attracting external resources (Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
 
Figure 2: Phases of Spin-off Development (Based on Vanaeslt et al. (2006) “Entrepreneurial Team Development in 
Academic Spinouts: An Examination of Team Heterogeneity” page: 255) 
2.4 Exploring Board formation in University Spin-Offs -  An Introduction 
Similarly, based on the aforementioned theoretical perspectives, Björnåli & Gulbrandsen 
(2010), set out to explore the formation and evolution of boards. They (pre-research) argue 
that during the legal incorporation of the company the constituted board members will be a 
reflection of the founding team’s existing personal network, with inherent characteristics 
resembling those of the founder, but enabling allocation of resources that the founding team 
does not have. Post-legal incorporation the board might experience changes, this due to the 
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fact that the venture needs to acquire or obtain outside resources to overcome specific 
challenges or critical junctures, thus solving certain problems that arise within the different 
development stages (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010). In response, they thus argue that the 
board members that are recruited in the post-startup stage will to a greater extent reflect the 
social network of the existing members sitting on the board (Ibid.). However, here they also 
iterate in unison with Lynall et al. (2003) that if the company has external stakeholders on the 
board, such as CEO or external financier, the board composition will also reflect these 
individuals’ social networks. Nonetheless, the new members are expected to bring critical 
resources to the board that they advertently lack.  
2.4.1 Propositions from Research 
Post-research Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) make a number of proposition and 
developmental arguments. In unison with Vanaelst et al. (2006) they find evidence that there 
is a difference between pre-startup and post-startup teams: during legal incorporation team 
and board members are chosen based on the founding team’s personal networks and estimates 
of additional resources that they need to acquire from external “outside” members, whilst 
after legal incorporation both team and board of directors may be involved in the process of 
adding additional board members (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010).  Hence, there is a 
evidential differentiation between the two stages. 
2.4.2 Who is Added and Why in the Start-Up Stage? 
During the legal start-up of the company Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) fond that the 
founding teams consisted of solely founders or founders and so-called “privileged witnesses”, 
where the latter is commonly seen as advisors that help guide the founders in the start-up 
stage and to whom the founders form a close relationship with (Vanaelst, et al. 2006).  In 
most cases these privileged witnesses were part of the university community, exempli gratia, 
incubator representatives, current and former MBA students, industrial partner et cetera 
(Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010).  
Furthermore, the privileged witnesses’ advisory role morphed as they became formalized with 
the subsequent establishment of the board; thus the privileged witness took a seat on the board 
with the founder(s) who were formally committed to the spin-off (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 
2010). However, instances where the privileged witness gave up his seat and appointed it to 
members from his personal network were also evident.  
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Thus, conclusively Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) state that the evidence provided spur 
notions connected to social networks and resource dependency. Entrepreneurs do in fact look 
at the acquaintances of the leader entrepreneur or team as the primary source for first board 
members; thus the board formation process is primarily driven by the social networks of the 
founders (ibid.). As Gulati & Gargiulo, (1999) postulated, as the founders develop 
professional relationships with the privileged witness who guides them till legal 
incorporation, this interaction transforms the latter into a “trusted informant”. Irrefutably, 
social relations between founders and privileged witnesses are thus imperative. 
2.4.3 When Do Main Board Changes Occur During Growth Stages? 
Overall Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) provide evidence that indicate that after the legal 
incorporation, the additional opted-for board members are associated with the progress of the 
spin-off from one stage to the other stage, or at least they, whether positive or negative, make 
the spin-off in question appear to approach closer to the next stage. Thus, they argue the 
addition to the board is often aligned with when reaching entrepreneurial milestone, exempli 
gratia, acquiring external capital, closing deals with collaborative partners, finding new 
business actors, expansion to markets, sampling product et cetera; actions that move the firm 
and its business forward (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010).  
2.4.4 Why Does the Board Change after the Company’s Legal Incorporation? 
After the firm legal incorporation and the subsequent initial formation of teams and board 
Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) state that the firm in question tries to recruit key individuals 
active outside the academic community, this since the initial board plausibly has a limited set 
of complementary resources that they can provide. Hence, the Spin-offs search the 
environment for new board members, who have the ability to procure and obtain resources, 
exempli gratia, seed or VC finance, market and/or industry knowledge and management skills 
(ibid.) via personal contacts of the initial board members or founder. In unison with Vohora et 
al. (2004) and Vanaelst et al. (2006) it was evidentially constituted that finance was the prime 
resource acquired through the new board member, who were all, exclusively, outsider and 
often investors. Second most prime were resources such as industry experience (including 
network and specific knowledge) acquired via new board members (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 
2010).  
The importance of having people with previous start-up experience is seen as quasi-
quintessential attribute to embody, however Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) argue in their 
evidence that prior start-up experience was a value that was not opted for as a prime resource 
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when selecting new board members. Perhaps this is because VC funding is more likely for 
teams of high quality (Florin, 2005).  
Following the second change in the board formation, all decisions were strategic, resource-
related consideration to who should be added to the board. Evidence suggests that during the 
second round of change new members were often outsiders: either VC or industry, whilst 
during the third change round new outside members were also opted for: investors, industry or 
CEO (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010).  Thus, conclusively, it is stipulated that board members 
retained during the second change were mostly investors and other people who contribute 
with finance and industry-specific networks and knowledge (ibid.), which complement the 
resources and capabilities of the firm. Moreover, during the third change the new members 
were most likely to be investors, professional executives and “knowers of markets” who had 
profound knowledge of the market in which potential customers and collaborators conducted 
business within (ibid.). The new members here helped by aiding in tasks such as, acquiring 
other resources, organization and administration, sales and marketing et cetera, while the new 
CEO, an external professional sometimes hired to replace the founder, was in these instances 
hired to crumble disarray by having vast executive experience which would aid in the need of 
more formalized organizational and administrative skills and routines (Björnåli & 
Gulbrandsen, 2010).  
Therefore, as the Resource Dependence Theory predicts, the board, to a larger extent, 
consisted of members who, by ascribing or adding value to the firm by having access and 
providing different resources, aim to aid the firm in its current dominant task and propel its 
prosperous future (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
2.4.5 How Are Board Members Added? 
While attempting to reach the Proof of Viability stage the new board members were selected 
to the board through the personal contacts of the privileged witnesses, the founder and the 
char of the board. In some few instances it was through the new CEO or investors (Björnåli & 
Gulbrandsen, 2010).  Interestingly, in some instances, an outsider who was elected to the 
board during the first change, later on became board chair and stayed with the spin-off. Thus, 
in these cases, as the chair was either an investor or an individual with 15-40 years of 
experience working in an industry, the subsequent members attracted in the following board 
changes had similar backgrounds (ibid.). Therefore, conclusively, it is stipulated that from the 
second change and onward the board composition to a larger extent reflected the social 
networks of the board chair, as social theory predicts (ibid.)  
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Furthermore, it was argued that if a firm has external stakeholders, exempli gratia, public 
research organizations or external financiers, on their boards, their board composition after 
legal start-up stage would also reflect the social networks of these aforementioned 
stakeholders (Björnåli & Gulbrandsen, 2010).  However, it was of even here unequivocally 
stipulated, as a convergence over time, that the later board members (selected after initial 
change) were mainly selected through the personal network of the board chair (ibid.). 
2.5 Research Model 
Based on the following theory, we argue it is of utter salience to provide an illustrative 
theoretical framework to aid in the research. As stipulated by research, there are many 
different variables to consider when discussing and researching board formation in a 
university spin-off setting. Hence, we propose the following framework (figure 3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A Theoretical Framework (based on RDT, SNT, LCT and the work of Björnåli &Gulbrandsen (2010). 
As we can see all the theories, Resource Dependence, Social Network and Life-Cycle are 
touched upon and elucidated within our framework, thus giving it omniscient academic 
legitimacy. Furthermore all the theory proposed by Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) is also 
incorporated in our framework which can be seen by the labels in the model. We contend the 
model will not only aid us in our research but also assist in the comprehension of our study 
for others as it provides a sterling overview of our theoretical stances.  
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3. Methodology 
The following chapter describes and elaborates on our chosen approaches and conveys the 
motivations why we did certain choices regarding our theoretical contributions and empirical 
evidence. We will thus present the design our approach, introduce the case samples we have 
had, the underpinnings in how we sampled the cases and the methods in relation to how we 
collected and analyzed the data. Conclusively, all of this will culminate in a discussion 
revolving around the quality of our methodological assumptions and endeavors. 
3.1 Research Design 
In this study we found it suitable to adopt and use a qualitative approach, due to the sole 
nature of our posed researched questions; the questions suggested that we did not have any 
prior plethora of information or enlightenment about the phenomenon, ergo, a qualitative 
methodology is preferred, as it allowed us to study the phenomenon’s complexity in a richer 
or deeper context (c.f Jacobsen, 2002). Furthermore, since we did not have any previous 
knowledge or information about corporate governance or board formation within our realm of 
research, the opting for a qualitative approach was strengthened; this as this approach strives 
to describe the world from an inside-out basis which, in elaboration, aided the facilitation of a 
better understanding of the social realities, processes, patterns, et cetera of participants’ point-
of-view (c.f Flick et al. 2004). All of the aforementioned allowed us to study a few units in 
time but simultaneously gather as many nuances from the latter as possible. We argue that 
this, modus operandi, was of imperative and salient nature since the aim of our research is to 
further understand the phenomenon of board formation. 
In unison with the substance argued in the previous paragraph, we further opted for a 
deductive research approach in order to cultivate and enrich our research. A deductive study, 
according to Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008) has its inception in the realization that theory is 
the prime source of knowledge. Incrementally, the researcher then utilized the proposed 
theory as a foundation to understand the phenomenon or conundrum and deduce hypotheses, 
which can ultimately then be subjected to the empirical study. Thus, in general terms, we 
focused on the transcendence; theory study to empirical study (c.f Jacobsen, 2002).  
Nevertheless, since we have argued that our subject of research is relatively unexplored 
within academia, we further stipulated that is was a prerequisite to try to paint a clearer 
picture in order to aid the determination of what was relevant to investigate. Thus, since our 
aim is to better understand the board formation of University spin-offs, we were compelled to 
ask our participants questions that would stimulate profound and relevant answers; hence we 
asked questions that were of “why” and “how” nature as this would properly permeate our 
intent and penetrate the conundrum. This is in accordance with Merriam (2009) and Yin 
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(2003) who argue that when “why” and “how” questions are to be answered an often opted-
for strategy is the case study, as its strength lies in its ability to enable to researcher to, in-
depth, study a case within its real-life context. Moreover, we have chosen to focus on Swedish 
University spin-offs as our unit of analysis; ergo, emphasis was on, ex ante, forming accurate 
research questions. This was imperative since it is argued that in order to select proper units of 
analysis, one must first have enunciated accurate and specified research questions (Yin, 
2003).  
3.2 Case Companies and Sampling Procedures 
In correlation with the consensus among data-collecting procedures of a case study, we 
subsequently focused on excavating information from our possible case interviewees. Since 
our aim was to study the phenomenon of board formation in a University spin-off setting it 
was of unequivocal stress that the sampled interviewees in fact had experience from the latter, 
otherwise their contributions would compromise our legitimacy. Upon approaching the viable 
candidates which we wished to interview, we formulated a set of criteria, which had to be 
fulfilled, ex ante, in order to assess whether the sample was viable or pertinent to us; this as 
the rendition of a proper screening procedure must have been undertaken pre collect-data 
phase, as this will ultimately result in the identification of pertinent interviewees (c.f Yin, 
2003). Furthermore, we also argued that it was important that the formulated criteria in 
question was aligned with and permeated our research objectives, so that the candidates, 
irrefutably, could be categorized as relevant and lead to valid accounts of information; the 
emphasis is once more on, pre data screening, setting forth and formulating criteria that will 
dictate the candidates pertinence (c.f Yin, 2003). Therefore, based on the aforementioned, we 
devised the following criterions: 
 Experience from sitting on University spin-off board(s) 
The case interviewees in our research had to have had some sort of experience from sitting on 
a board in a University spin-off setting. Preferably, we wanted to see individuals coming from 
different sectors; one could be a trusted witness, one could be a prominent industry person, 
one could be a spin-off CEO, one other could be an incubator or venture capitalist we 
propose. Irrefutably, the amount of experience is imperative to acknowledge.  
 Sitting period 
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Preferably we see that our candidates had been sitting on the board for at least 12 months to 
ensure that they could, over time, notice the changes that the board in fact did undergo. This, 
ex ante, is hard for us to corroborate as to being an appropriate time-axis or not, but we 
argued that 12 months is the minimum prerequisite for this study. 
From the aforementioned, it is both naïve and inevitable to try to ignore the fact that from our 
outlined criteria one could have extracted hundreds of plausibly pertinent candidates that 
unarguably could have been relevant for us in this instance. Thus, we conclusively chose the 
candidates that fulfilled the criteria, wanted to be interviewed and, most importantly, had the 
time to be interviewed were selected as our samples. Also, as an undisclosed amount of the 
candidates wanted assurance on anonymity, pseudonyms have been assigned to all 
respondents and companies, to encumber de-anonymization.   
Retrospectively, we are aware that the amount of respondents was substandard in relation to 
the outlined amount set forth pre-research. However, external circumstances such as time and 
schedules of several of the wished-for respondents made our outlined amount unattainable; 
thus making our empirical evidence section somewhat lacking, as empirical material was hard 
to acquire. Nonetheless, we still promptly argue our empirical evidence is valid and relevant, 
although some might argue the eventuality of bias; it has been in our most paramount interest 
to mitigate the latter. 
3.3 The Data Collection: Secondary Data and Primary Data 
The vast majority of the secondary data that has been incorporated in our research has 
consisted of scholarly articles that encapsulate the thoughts and academic contributions in 
relation to corporate governance, board formation and University spin-offs. We argue that the 
collection of secondary data facilitates a researcher to attempt to form interpretations of the 
information and by using reliable sources, to a large extent, enhances the overall credibility 
(c.f Jacobsen, 2002). Therefore we also, without pre-conceived notions, conducted the 
essential and critical step of reviewing the entire collection of secondary data before deciding 
whether to yay or nay them on a basis of academic credit and legitimacy. Furthermore, we 
also decided to use a blend of seminal and much-cited acknowledged articles along with less-
credited but still relevant work, to broaden the spectrum. The data found was mainly, but not 
exclusively, found through the different search engines available such as: SAGE, EBSCO, 
Summon University of Gothenburg, Google Scholar, Web of Science and Scopus. Many of 
the engines (mainly excluding Google scholar) enabled an efficient search due to the 
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possibility of “combination keyword” searches; we could narrow search results by combining 
keyword such as, exempli gratia, board formation + USO + corporate governance. We found 
a large body of research on aggregate corporate governance, even less on USO related 
governance and very little on board formation, especially in a USO setting. However, in the 
end, we argue pertinent information was found that we could utilize.  
After having undergone the process of electing case companies we decided it was time to 
interview the candidates as our primary method of attaining our primary data. Since we opted 
for a case study, qualitative interviews are regarded as the most important source of 
information, this as they promote the creation of understandings based on the perspective of 
the candidate (c.f Yin, 2003; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). In addition we also opted for a 
strategy to interview a small quantity of candidates as we argue this would create a better 
understanding of the phenomenon; this is something Kvale (2006) in unison argues as this 
approach increases deeper interpretations and results from the data collected. As we 
previously stated, it was important to ask “why” and “how” questions before conducting the 
interview; ultimately as they are to be categorized as the “right” questions. We decided to 
create a structured interview guide, based on the theory and research model (see chapter 2), 
this as it would enable us to ensure the incorporation of all areas of theory and it would also 
act as support during the interview. This is as Jacobsen (2002) states the strength of a 
structured interview; it provides a clear overview of pertinent questions which the researcher 
wishes to have accounts on. Furthermore, we tried to promote an open and non-hostile 
atmosphere in order to create a comprehensive dialogue. In practice, this meant that we 
focused on reducing tension and the risk of threatening the interviewee by commencing the 
interviews with asking general, more open questions, as we argue this would ease the 
atmosphere, minimize risk and undermine the delivery of distorted information by the 
interviewee. As stipulated by Yin (2003) a researcher might operate on different levels; 
asking questions that are in direct response to the research questions, but also, simultaneously, 
non-threatening and amiable questions, aiming to foster a pleasant atmosphere.  
The interview is a social construction (Alvesson, 2003). Therefore it is commonplace that 
contextual effects may occur and their subsequent influence will vary depending on the 
environment in which the interview takes place. We chose to conduct the interviews in a 
natural environment, that is a place where the interviewee is comfortable, and not an artificial 
environment, where the contrary is in play, as this might have an unbecoming impact on the 
answers (c.f Jacobsen, 2002). Presumptively, we saw the workplace as a natural environment 
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and therefore tried to conduct all interviews within this setting, and all interviews were made 
in person. Moreover, all the interviews were also recorded to ensure that we could provide an 
accurately transcribed reflection of the interview accounts which would ultimately increase 
the credibility of our research. Conclusively, it is also imperative to note that the interviews 
were conducted using the Swedish language, only to later be translated into English. This 
might, reasonably, be posed a situation where fallacious cross-lingual errors might arise, 
however we argue that our bi-lingual proficiency is more than adequate to quench this matter.   
3.4 Evaluation of Sources 
An absolute plethora of the articles and scholarly contributions that we have included in our 
research has been published in academically credited and peer-acknowledged scholarly 
journals. It was a somewhat challenging, but to a large extent it was relatively convenient and 
straight-forward to find relevant articles regarding corporate governance and USO’s. 
However, finding information on board formation in a USO setting was for starters quite 
frustrating, but not impossible. Much emphasis lays on the model proposed by Björnåli & 
Gulbrandsen (2010), this due to the fact that its raison d’être so delicately conveys the 
phenomenon that we wished to explore. Moreover, it can be argued that some of the 
references and sources used in this work may be seen as somewhat old, which might impede 
legitimacy. However, we argue that most of the “old” work proposed and used in our 
research, although not seminal, is still the work of scholars with great credits, such as Pfeffer 
& Salancik (1978) despite the age of their work. However, in regard to the Swedish context 
little has been found, therefore, we ultimately decided to incorporate and integrate all the 
theories and test our model in a Swedish context for disclosing possible universality.  
Additionally, we were aware that much of the theory used in our research is based on 
information compiled from an American context, apart from some evidence that has shed 
some light upon the context of Norway and Belgium. Therefore we have carefully, ex ante, 
evaluated whether or not applicability is threatened. However since we aim to test our 
model’s applicability in a Swedish context we do not regard it to be an alarming issue, apart 
from being mentioned. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The interview guide was based on our research model; this approach’s raison d’être aims to 
create clear and useful empirical data that could be connected to the theoretical framework 
and thus, ultimately facilitate a proper analysis process. In order to enable an analysis it is 
crucial that you have structured the collected data, which is what we aimed at accomplishing 
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(c.f Backman, 1998); and in the interview setting there are a plurality of different analysis 
methods (c.f Kvale, 2006). Upon completion of the interviews we set in motion the process of 
transcribing all the interview material. Although this is an immense time-consuming 
procedure, we argue it organizes the data, giving it structure, which is beneficial to the 
analysis process (c.f Jacobsen, 2002). Therefore we continued to read the transcribed 
interviews multiple times in order to familiarize ourselves with and truly comprehend the 
accounts provided. In more detail, our analysis process commenced with finding patterns, 
similarities, dissimilarities, contrasts et cetera within the empirical findings (c.f Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008). Then we evaluated theses points in relation to our research model and 
theory in order to pinpoint divergences and convergences of interest. 
3.6 Quality Discussion 
When conducting qualitative research, the concepts of validity and reliability, which are often 
opted for in settings characterized with a high in-flux of quantitative variables and methods, 
are somewhat ambiguous in their applicability. These aforementioned concepts have, ergo, 
been supplanted by another more relevant concept which is more applicable in cases of 
qualitative nature, namely: Trustworthiness (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). According to 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) who originally elaborated upon the concept of trustworthiness paint 
the picture where trustworthiness can be seen as an aggregate label for a set of variables that 
together constitute overall trustworthiness of a study: (1) Dependability, (2) Transferability, 
(3) Credibility, and (4) Confirmability. These four variables will henceforth be subjected to 
evaluation and substantiated below. 
The dependability of our undertakings, we argue, is strengthened by the methodological 
chapter provided in the study. Here we have clearly and unbiased, presented and described the 
different steps, processes and procedures that we have undertaken. Moreover, all the 
interviews that we conducted were recorded, in step one, to later be transcribed, in step two, 
which completed the circle; all of this to ensure that all documentation is accounted for and to 
provide an as accurate rendition as possible (c.f Yin, 2003). In general, we argue that all 
information relevant to the study have been disclosed, all to improve our dependability of our 
research. We further contend that the transferability is stellar. We clearly, from the start, 
delineated that the aim of our study was to qualitatively study board formation of University 
spin-offs in a Swedish context, thus contributing to the existing body of scholarly work. The 
theory in our framework is transparent in its origin and clearly illustrated their thoughts, 
which are then incorporated in to a research model. Finally, the synthesis of our empirical 
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evidence and their theoretical thoughts is something that strengthens the transferability. We 
also argue that the credibility is valid. Here, it is argued as familiarization and involvement 
with the topic increases, so does the credibility. Despite our more assiduous efforts, it would 
be a lie not to say that time was short and to our disadvantage. However, we still argue that 
the interviews we conducted gave the pertinent information we wanted to obtain, so in no way 
do we discredit or find our material corrupt, which would hurt our credibility. The 
Confirmability we argued is elucidated by providing clear linkages between our empirical 
findings and theory. We argue this is important to stress as these linkages lead to the erosion 
and disembarking of imaginative conclusions and interpretations, which is important to 
quench. Furthermore, our research model has in some sense, metaphorically acted as a bridge, 
sustaining the linkage.  
In summary, we finally argue that the overall trustworthiness of our research is unequivocally 
not substandard in any regard. Nonetheless, we still contend that subconscious or involuntary 
fallaciousness can have contributed to certain errors; however we toll the bell of assurance 
that it has been our unqualified intent to minimize such inexorable mistakes, if they have 
occurred. Thus, this chapter has evolved and deepened the outlines of the different 
methodological methods that we have chosen to utilize; all of which can be graphically 
illustrated by the following figure 4:  
 
Figure 4: An Overview of the Methodological Stances 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
The following chapter presents a summary of the empirical evidence that we have managed to 
collect from our case sampled candidates. First we begin with a short introduction and 
background of our interviewees. This will then be followed by sections where we will 
investigate and present the evidence from the accounts in a structured manner.  
4.1 Interviewee Introduction 
 
The interviewees that are presented in this study have all been assigned proper and relevant 
pseudonyms due to the fact that absolute anonymity was wished for. The equivalent measures 
have been applied to the companies, as this anonymity was also a part of the informed 
consensus. Nonetheless, a short introductive summary is adequate in order to get acquainted 
with the interviewees accounted for in the text. Janne Liljeblad is a 72 year-old Businessman 
with tons of experience within the field of business venture and creation. He has been 
working with the latter for more than 20 years, and during the last years he has been working 
for Excavator, which is an incubation-like entity, and therefore he embodies experience on the 
subject. Andreas Johanesson is the 33 year-old acting CEO and CO-founder of Hydropro AB 
which was founded in 2007. The company has more or less been borderless in its activities 
since birth and has won numerous prizes and awards since its inception. Founded in 
collaboration between SAAB Group and Chalmers University of Technology they mainly 
supply their customers with a kite-like turbine that converts energy from tidal streams and 
flows into electricity, but also offer similar hydro-technical solutions. Jimmy Hasselblad is a 
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28 year-old Business Developer and acting CEO at Prosteria AB. During his education he was 
a CO-founder of the company as a part of the collaboration between Stora Enso and Chalmers 
University of Technology in 2012. Present in the healthcare industry, they provide a range of 
intelligent pharmaceutical packaging solutions which aim at improving or quenching the 
issues related to poor adherence to prescription instructions, which is associated with high 
costs, and thus problematic.  
4.2 Janne at Excavator 
When we ask Janne about the first board formations in the USO’s that he has been monitoring 
as a part of Excavator, he explains that in the genesis phase, when the companies-to-be are 
more of a project than a legally approved entity, a board in theory is not a prerequisite, but 
when they ultimately reach the level of legal entity, when they form a limited company, the 
first board is usually comprised of individuals involved in the development of the idea or 
project from inception. Moreover, he further divulges that in the cases where the USO’s are 
linked to Excavator, it is common that the companies also opt to add representatives from 
Excavator as a board member, to function primarily as a mentor for the others. 
We commence the conversation by discussing board formation and its composition and thus 
subsequently ponder if it is of normal behavior for the composition to change over time, and if 
that is the case: how many times does it normally change, why it changes and who gets 
elected? Janne discloses unequivocally that boards change over time, which is inexorable. 
Often this is reality due to the fact that the direction that the company has embarked upon 
requires attentive stimulation. They need to acquire some skill or knowledge to continue to 
strive towards their goals and therefore it is natural for the company to pay attention outside 
their own organization’s perimeter(s) for potential guidance and knowledge. Therefore, he 
enunciates the trend that, regardless of where the company is in time, the newly appointed 
member will exclusively provide some knowledge or sought-after resource which the 
company in question presently lacks. “If you compare a more mature company to a young 
company, of course they will search for different kind of resources due to the fact that they 
are in different situations, but the pint is that it all boils down to the fact that they need 
something that they currently do not have”, Janne vividly exemplifies. Ergo, different 
situations require different individuals with different traits. These individuals thus tend to be 
individuals with greater industry and commercial experience in general. 
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Furthermore, when we ask Janne to be more precise and concrete about how often and how 
many changes in board formation there usually are, the answer is naturally quasi-ambiguous. 
He hypothesizes that it is hard to estimate how many, and that it depends from case to case 
(due to contingencies surrounding the company) but roughly between two or four changes is 
not uncommon from his experience during the years that he has been employed at Excavator. 
Once again, he denotes the reason for these changes is nearly always an attempt to attain more 
experience or a new set of skills that is needed to excel towards new foci or goals.  
Moreover, we continue to discuss the people that are selected as new board members. We 
attempt to understand how they find these possible nominees and if their own social 
network(s) is a big part of this procedure, and Janne is absolutely irrefutably certain it is. He 
paints a picture where he compares the mentioned phenomenon to Silicon Valley as a cluster 
for competence, experience and skill. He argues that these complementary skills and 
relationships between companies are crucial and “what you give, you will get back”, is a 
motto that Janne strongly believes in. Therefore, social ties are of grave salience. 
We additionally ask Janne about the chairman of the board in these companies, and who tends 
to be selected. Janne argues that most commonly, someone within the current board’s social 
network with a lot of experience from the specific industry in question gets appointed. When 
we then ask if additional people at a later state gets selected from the chairman’s network 
specifically to the board, Janne says that it depends, sometimes and sometimes not, and that it 
is not important whose network the person is selected from, but rather that the individual in 
question is the jigsaw piece that fits the rest of the puzzle; thus creating symbiosis.  
Ultimately, as we discuss venture capitalists and privileged witnesses like himself in boards 
and their influence, Janne claims that they have neither more nor less influence. When it 
comes to VC’s, their influence is normally regulated via contracts and other types of 
agreements, but other than that, the potential in each member of the board is used as much as 
it is needed for the organization to continue their development. Skill and experience is as 
previously mentioned the traits that the people involved in USO’s seek the most, he iterates.  
4.3 Andreas at Hydropro AB 
We commence the interview by inquiring about the first board formation and who was 
included and why they were included at all. Andreas argues that because of early interest from 
stakeholders around the company, they quickly transitioned into a limited company. The first 
board included himself, Martin, a representative from Excavator that helped them from the 
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beginning and a representative from SAAB with tons of experience and knowledge about the 
industry in question. They were all either “students” (the project group) or representatives 
from Chalmers University of Technology, either directly or indirectly. 
We proceed to talk about the transformation of the board and Andreas addresses the questions 
with saying that there have been numerous changes to the board composition. As previously 
stated, they were four in the inception phase and now they are six, and at the same time 
individuals have been discharged from their duties on the board, others have been recruited. 
The individuals that have been acquired have always possessed some sort of skill or 
knowledge that they sought or needed at the given time, Andreas acknowledges. Primarily 
they searched for pure knowledge and competence which was relevant to their business 
operations, however vast industrial experience was additionally a factor of imperative nature 
that was wished to attain. Some of the individuals that have been chosen as board members 
have been either Venture Capitalists or representatives of investment companies with vast 
networks and knowledge themselves. 
Furthermore, Andreas states that they have changed the board about four times and once again 
stresses the fact that a change in board composition has been made when a certain trait/-s has 
been lacking within the company. As an example, Andreas tells us that before they expanded 
their business to Great Britain (which they did early on, as they gained international attention 
by winning an array of different awards), they needed someone with international experience 
to guide them through unknown territory, especially as this change came so close to the 
founding of their company. “You know, you do not attract less attention after winning a 
bunch of awards, if you know what I mean”, Andreas smilingly adds. 
Andreas says that if any acquisition of any member on the board happened at a crucial time, it 
must have been the selection of their current chairman, which was before they expanded 
internationally as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Andreas therefore, ex ante, addresses 
our questions about the chairman of the board without us luring him in that direction. He tells 
us about the chairman, who has filled that role for years now. He has vast experience from the 
field and is according to Andreas a remarkable man and has irrefutably been an asset to the 
company throughout the entire process, but he further discloses that they have not acquired 
many, if any, people through his social network to the board. 
Moreover, we ask Andreas if social networks have been a big part of the process when 
searching for new viable applicants and Andreas agrees with that premise. He explains that in 
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every case, the appointed individual has always, in some fashion, been connected to 
someone’s personal network in the current board. 
We further discuss the benefits and intricacies in regard to Venture Capitalists and privileged 
witnesses from companies like Excavator, Andreas claims that the influence from these 
people have been sporadically challenging, but at the same time positive, important and a 
necessity. “Of course, some relationships have been tense and difficult, especially when we 
have been under a lot of stress, but in the end, we have always worked them through and the 
results have so far been positive”, Andreas states. The VC’s are usually a part of the board on 
a contractual basis, thus as representative for investment firms and their portfolio. Their 
competence and knowledge is important for them according to Andreas, otherwise they 
wouldn’t be sitting there. 
As we conclude the interview, we ask about the possibility that these Venture Capitalists 
might be sheltering their own “portfolio interests” from certain contingencies. He argues he is 
aware of the risk, but at the same time he does not consider the issue so alarming so one 
should excessively worry, even though he admits it could be something to be more concerned 
over when times get harder, which is something that the company has yet to experience on a 
large scale.  
4.4 Jimmy at Prosteria AB 
After an insightful presentation of the company and its products and employees, we start to 
discuss the first board, its first members and their underlying reason(s) for being members at 
all. Jimmy says that he desires to start the story before they were a limited company, when 
they were a project group consisting of three students from the educational program, two 
representatives from Excavator, and two representatives from Stora Enso. He tells us bluntly, 
that they (being the students) did not really have much to say, and merely seen as “quasi-
muppets” carrying out the plans and strategic moves that the other four (Excavator and Stora 
Enso) pinned out for them. “It felt kind of weird at the start of the project, that we did not 
contribute with more than our energy and dedication and they did all the “real work”, but 
after a short time, we could clearly see that their knowledge and experience would help us a 
big deal looking forward”, Jesper argues. The only real change they could have potentially 
changed or influenced was that if the relationship with one or both of the privileged witnesses 
from excavator was harming the process of developing the project, they could contact 
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Excavator and file a complaint which could result in change, exempli gratia, discharging the 
person from his or her duties, but that was pretty much it. 
Furthermore, when we ask why these people were chosen, he says that they were not really 
chosen, they were more or less given since Stora Enso had the technology and the history as 
they were the company that had laid down the ground work by developing and figuring out 
the main concept of the core-product, and the representatives from Excavator was the people 
who brought it all together and was regulated by rules as they were a USO company, Ergo the 
board was chosen. Jimmy argues, that all of these aforementioned individuals were fantastic 
to have present within the company’s walls, especially one from Stora Enso who had all the 
history and data from developing the core product, but he stresses that all of the 
representatives contributed with their network and knowledge. He exemplifies by also talking 
about a special representative from Excavator, who has been involved in numerous of small 
start-up companies and knew all the pitfalls and shortcuts to better developing the project. He 
also adds that these individuals were not all included in the first board; it had changed 
numerous times along to path to becoming a limited company. He further stresses, that during 
the fall, a couple of months before they turned into a limited company, they took a hard look 
at and assessed the individuals involved in the company at the time and their knowledge/skill 
and experience and ultimately concluded that they were in need of someone who had recent 
and vast experience from the industry in question, which was Pharmaceutical. As they vetted 
the market, through the board’s own contacts, they found Karin, who met their criteria well. 
Karin, including two representatives from Excavator and one of the students as a 
representative for the original students, formed the first board as they in a legally binding 
sense morphed into a limited company. 
The representatives from Excavator who were involved in the project from the start were not 
the same who were chosen as board members. The business coach who worked as a mentor 
for the group was replaced, but Jimmy tells us that they still maintain an informal relationship 
with the former mentor, which constitutes a continued arena for guidance, communication and 
counseling. 
Furthermore, Jimmy postulates that the experienced individuals included in the present board 
at times also fill a potential gap in the “students” portfolio, as they are young and have limited 
repertoire of referential experience. The board and their vast connections and knowledge can 
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help them attain some legitimacy and attract more individuals as a subsequent and direct 
consequence. 
Since Prosteria is a young company, they have not changed the board formally since the 
registration of the company. But when we ask Jimmy about the future and potential changes 
as the company grows, he brings up the fact that the company will need capital to finance 
continued growth, and therefore feel the urge to contact a VC or angel to aid them in future 
endeavors, and he rapidly adds that as a result of latter, they aim at probably adding someone 
to the board. 
Furthermore, we continue to discuss and dissect VC’s and future investments. Jimmy argues 
firmly that they do not want “bad money” and he explains that they will search for the “right” 
investor with skills or experience that align with their visions and goals both externally and 
internally, since more often than not, people who invest money usually have opinions about 
how the business should be run. Therefore it is crucial that the investor is a suitable match on 
more levels besides solely being the “doctor” that injects the remedy of capital. 
As we ask Jimmy, where they might find someone like this, he postulates that the industry in 
Sweden is really small, and that nearly everyone entrenched in it  have a wide array 
acquaintances on some level; thus it probably will be through personal recommendations.  
As we conclude the interview, we talk about what Jimmy thinks will be future changes in the 
board formation of the company, and he discloses that someone will be added to the board for 
certain, but no one will be “thrown out”. He argues that this action will be further elaborated 
and hopefully implemented when they acquire funding in the form of capital through an 
investor, VC or “angel” in about six months. He argues that they need someone who 
possesses experience and knowledge about sales and market communication, since that is 
something they currently lacking within the company. He says that that have started to scan 
the market for possible applicants. 
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 5.  Analysis 
The following analytical chapter divulges upon the results collected from our empirical data, 
which in a juxtaposing manner, is put in contrast to the adherent theories elaborated on our 
theoretical framework.  Thus, the former and the latter dyad are presented and scrutinized in a 
sense-making manner against each other, bearing our research model in mind. The embarked 
approach will facilitate and arena for excavation of findings and arguments. 
5.1 Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) in essence stipulates the plausible influential 
conduciveness external factors might endue upon organizational behavior and decisions. 
Furthermore, as mentioned, both Hillman et al. (2009) and Pfeffer (1972b) argue RDT has 
often been ascribed when examining board composition as an indicator of the latter to attain 
critical resources and competencies to the firm; as a response to the external environment’s 
conditions. All of our respondents provide accounts that are in concurrence with 
aforementioned theoretical assumptions. Janne argues that they always look for outside 
guidance and knowledge, where new board members provide knowledge or resources that the 
company lacks at the given time; thus depending on the situation of the company different 
people with different traits are opted for.  Moreover, both Andreas and Jimmy are in unison 
with Janne’s statement. Andreas states that they have always recruited new boards members 
based on the premise of knowledge or skill they have wanted or needed at a given time which 
has been lacking; often being pure knowledge or competence relevant to business operations. 
Jimmy aligns his answer along the same axis, stating that they are looking for the “right” 
investor with skills or experience that meet their visions and goal and someone who has 
marketing knowledge, as this is lacking within company walls. 
Additionally, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) specifically divulge that directors can bring about 
four conducive contributions to organizations: (1) advice, counsel and information, (2) access 
to information channels, (3) access and preference to resources, and (4) legitimacy. All of our 
respondents, either explicitly or implicitly, in their accounts describe similar traits in the 
acquired board members. Janne states that they tend to have greater industry and commercial 
experience, implicitly alluding to all the antecedents. Andreas explicitly describes, for 
example, when they recruited a new board member to aid in the cumbersome entailments a 
UK expansion foretold, this recruitment was imperative for guiding through the unknown 
territory; hereby alluding to antecedents (1), (2), and (3) specifically. Finally, Jimmy 
specifically argues that their board with their inherent vast connections and knowledge aid 
them in attaining legitimacy, which subsequently attracts more individuals, hereby alluding to 
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antecedent (4). Conclusively, we argue that Resource Dependence Theory irrefutably attains 
connotations that imply its legitimacy in our study. It is evident that our respondents in their 
actions can be linked to the theory in question.  
5.2 Social Network Theory (SNT) 
Social Network Theory (SNT) explores the possible conducive outcomes that can be extracted 
from social ties, and personal networks of individuals. Timmons & Spinelli (2004) argue that 
firms often explore the lead entrepreneur’s or team’s personal network for outside directors. 
Moreover, both Forbes et al. (2006) and Westphal (1999) argue that the addition of board 
members is driven by actor’s social and interpersonal networks and relations; new board 
members are recruited by social networks. All of our respondents account for the salience of 
social networks and their actuality in regard to their own, post ante, decisions and actions. 
Janne states that it is common that someone from the board’s current social network gets 
appointed as a new board member, and also highlights the grave importance of 
complementary skills and relationships, in clusters such as Silicon Valley; these social ties are 
what he aims to enforce. Both Andreas and Jimmy concur; the former argues that in every 
new appointment case, the new member has be connected to someone’s personal network in 
the current board, while the latter explains when they recruited their current chairman, it was 
through the board’s own contact network, and future additions will likely be through personal 
recommendations. However, in contrast to Timmons & Spinelli’s (2004) positions no explicit 
evidence from our respondents seems to be of corroborative nature. However, we argue it is 
naïve to exclude its legitimacy in our study due to lacking this nuance. It is possible that some 
additions to the board could have been via the lead team or entrepreneur’s personal network; 
however it has not been explicitly disclosed in our case and can thus only be suggestive in our 
findings. Overall, conclusively, our empirical findings elucidate the alignment of Social 
Network Theory in theory and in practice. The evidence suggests that we can confidently state 
the resilience between theory and practice in this matter.   
5.3 Life-Cycle Theory of a University Spin-Off (LCT) 
Life-Cycle Theory (LCT) stipulates that a Spin-Off goes through a number of phases in its 
commercialization and developmental process (Vohora et al.2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006). stage 
(1) is a team that is working with a research project and have found an opportunity in the 
market, reached out, tried to protect their IP and/or their patent and commercialize their IP. 
Stage (2) is a team that has identified an opportunity in the market and committed to the 
actual creation of a spin-off. Stage (3) is a team that has legally founded a venture and has 
30 
 
  
allocated resources necessary to develop the spin-off. Stage (4) is teams who have proven 
viability and built up maturity and sustainability; hereby manifesting credibility outside the 
academic and scientific realm, thus attracting external resources. Furthermore, Vanaelst et al. 
(2006) argue that between all the phases the venture will face critical junctures, which have to 
be overcome if to continue towards success. Both of our Spin-Off company representatives 
Andreas and Jimmy implicitly state that they have already passed stages (1), (2) and (3) this 
since they have legally been founded, which can be substantiated by the AB (Aktiebolag) 
acronym assigned to the company name. Thus, they have become a legal entity, according to 
Swedish Law and commenced the development of the venture. In regard to critical junctures, 
they are inevitable and somewhat of an ubiquitous occurrence that arises within the realm of 
business, nonetheless both Andreas and Jimmy give examples: Andreas states that the 
recruitment of their current chairman was, to say the least, imperative when they started the 
expansion in the UK, which was a big commitment for the venture for striving towards stage 
(4). Jimmy states that they, within six months, will plow capital in the venture via VC or 
angel co-operation to propel the venture forward which probably simultaneously will lead to 
another board change; also striving toward stage (4). Overall we argue that critical junctures 
have been experienced by our samples in regard to the aforementioned phases of 
development. However we further argue that the two ventures are at different stages in their 
mission of propelling towards a concrete abutment with stage (4). Hydropro AB is clearly 
ahead in its development, due to its active age as a legal venture and its already “born global” 
appearing internationalization commitments, whereas Prosteria AB have surmounted the 
viability step but are still trailing Hydropro in regard to progress towards maturity and 
sustainability, we argue. Nevertheless, the applicability of the phases of development in our 
study we find to be of pertinent character.  
5.4 Exploring Board Formation in University Spin-Offs  
5.4.1 Who is Added and Why in the Start-up Stage? 
Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) found that the board formation in the start-up stage consisted 
solely from members of the founding team or together with a trusted witness who could be 
viewed as an advisor or councilor to whom the founding team form a strong connection and 
amiable relationship to. They also found out that in line with RDT, individuals recruited to the 
board are primarily found within the social network of the founding team and/or the 
privileged witnesses social network.  
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Basen on the latter, Janne, as a representative of Excavator, confirmed that the first board is 
usually made up by the project group (the founding teams in these cases) involved from the 
start, at least with most of the startups he has been involved in, but the teams often includes a 
privileged witness from Excavator to sit in on the board as a mentor and councilor to the 
founding team. Andreas at Hydropro told us that the first board constellation was made up by 
him and Martin, (who were members from the project group and, ipso facto, founding team), 
a privileged witness or councilor from Excavator and an individual from SAAB, who had 
developed the technology from the start and drawn out the core idea, to help them with 
providing knowledge and experience about the industry. This person from SAAB was found 
within the privileged witnesses’ personal social network; they also sat on the first board and 
supervised them during start-up. Jimmy at Prosteria postulated that their first board was made 
up by Linnéa (as a representative of the founding team), two representatives from Excavator 
(who were privileged witnesses) and an individual with extensive experience about the 
pharmaceutical industry who became chairmen of the board. She was found through the 
personal social network of both the privileged witnesses that were included in the first board 
because they realized they needed her knowledge and skill about the industry in question. 
All cases above, mentions a trusted witness, combined with the founding team (the project 
group) were people appointed as board members as they were legally incorporated as a 
legitimate limited company. Other people who were added in both Andreas and Jimmy’s case 
were individuals found in the social network of the privileged witnesses, which further 
denotes a clear similarity to what the authors found in their research. In contrast to what we 
the authors found we can see in both Andreas and Jimmy’s case, people who were not 
privileged witnesses or members or the founding team were selected as board members. We 
reflect that this might be a product of the special settings provided at Excavator, where 
external parts from companies are deeply involved as the project group progresses and form 
relationships with the project group, and therefore become important for the founding team to 
have within the company as the strive towards their goals. 
5.4.2 When Do Main Board Changes Occur During Growth Stages and Why Are Board 
Members Added After Legal Incorporation 
The authors Björnåli & Gulbrandsen’s (2010) research provided evidence, as previously 
mentioned, that concluded that after the corporation becomes a legal entity, additional board 
changes in spin-offs are closely matched with progress where the spin-off appears to be closer 
to the next step towards maturity they need to take in order to achieve their goals. Therefore, 
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changes are often made, according to the authors, when they reach certain crossroads or 
critical junctures where external help is needed to get past the hurdle. This could be, for 
instance, in connection with acquiring of new capital, finding new business partners and 
whilst expanding to new markets et cetera. The authors have also concluded, that changes 
after legal incorporation in board composition are often a fact, when the venture needs 
external help they do not possess at the time, so they try to attain this knowledge or skill or 
experience externally, by recruiting new members to the board. During our research, we have 
found evidence that validates what the authors in fact postulate.  
Janne is very clear about the reasons why and when composition changes and says to his 
knowledge, there is nearly always an attempt to attain something that the company in its 
present form does not possess. By recruiting new members, they can achieve this and help 
them towards excelling as a company. Andreas argues that every change they have ever made, 
which is to the present day four times, they have made those changes because they needed 
something they did not embody at the time. He postulates that new members have been either 
Venture Capitalists, representatives from investment companies, which provided external 
capital, or people with great experience, knowledge and/or skill about the industry. He 
specifies his answer by telling us about the present chairmen, who were crucial to them in the 
given time he was appointed, since he had the experience and the knowledge about reaching 
international markets and therefore was very important to them both in general, and in 
specific cases where they were aiming to penetrate the British market. Andreas also postulates 
that some of members are representatives from companies that injected capital from an 
external partner, and therefore obtained a seat on the board. Since Jimmy’s company has not 
yet made any changes, post-legal incorporation, to the board composition, he does not express 
any concrete evidence that supports the latter. However, he is very clear about the fact that he 
knows that during the next couple of months, they will have to plow capital from an external 
source, like a VC or angel, and therefore will appoint someone new to the board. However, 
Jimmy argues that the ideal situation is to find a VC that is both willing to put up capital, and 
who fits their profile and shares their visions, since VC’s who put up equity usually have 
personal agendas when it comes to how they take care of the business. He further postulates, 
that at the moment they are looking for someone with sales and market experience and 
knowledge, since this is something that they current unwillingly lack within the company’s 
walls. 
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Why our findings are cohesive with what the authors found is not especially strange. If 
everything is working as it should, there is no need to change anything. Changes are made 
when things need to take another direction, not carry on in the same patterns, so the findings 
seem rather clear to us. 
5.4.3 How Are Board Members Added? 
As previously stipulated in the aforementioned sections, Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) 
divulge that new board appointments were made through the personal networks of the 
privileged witness, the founder and the chair of the board. We have no concrete evidence that 
suggests that during proof of viability stage, new seats are specifically not found through the 
personal networks of the existing board. Au contraire, we can clearly underline the fact that 
all board additions are linked to the individuals that currently sit on the board. Hence if, for 
example, a privileged witness sit on the board, it is conceivable that additions or changes to 
the board will be via the latter’s personal network. For instance, Janne hypothesized that it is 
not important which individuals social network the appointed member originates from, but 
rather that the individual possesses the sought after traits. When asked if additional members 
get appointed through the chairmen’s network at a later stage, he iterates “Sometimes, and 
sometimes not”. This statement corroborates what is previously argued by us.  
Furthermore, Björnåli & Gulbrandsen (2010) proclaim that an external or outsider, who was 
elected during the first board change after legal incorporation, later on became chairmen of 
the board and stayed with the spin-off. Our findings follow the same patterns, but there is one 
major distinction in play of fascinating character. Consistent with the authors, we found that 
in Jimmy’s case, an external part was introduced to the group as the group changed for the 
first time and were later on elected as chairmen of the board, but this happened before the 
legal incorporation. They were therefore not a board in a legal sense. However upon founding 
during university, they had an informal board which discharged the same duties as a legal 
ditto would. This, we argue, is an enthralling fact to further divulge upon. 
5.5 An Analytical Reflection 
Using our research model as an analytical tool to aid us perlustrate the empirical data, 
irrefutably was of grave salience in gaining a greater understanding of the studied 
paradigmAlthough the model was deficient in some areas, overall its legitimacy in our study 
has been of imperative nature. Subsequently, conclusive remarks from the analysis varied in 
different ways, which will be processed and further scrutinized in the following chapter. 
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6. Conclusions 
The following conclusion chapter will present findings and results from our study by 
answering the denoted research questions. Furthermore, we will embark on a path where we 
discuss the managerial implications of our study where we specifically answer how conducive 
our study is for the field of practical management. Finally, we intend to elaborate a discussion 
in regard to how future research could use our findings and how to extend this line of 
research. 
6.1 Empirical and Theoretical Contributions 
The purpose of this study was to embark on an academic sojourn and dive into the 
phenomenon, which in colloquial terms, revolves around board formation in a Swedish USO 
setting. Hence, our most paramount intention has been to increase the knowledge of the latter 
within the corporate governance field and subsequently provide imperative insights for 
contemporary and future research. The research questions stipulated and formulated in this 
study aim at elucidating the purpose by answering the following: 
1. How and why are specific individuals selected as board members in USO’s? 
 
2. Does the selection of board members vary depending on what stage in the life-cycle 
the firm is in?   
1. The empirical evidence found in our qualitative study suggests a clear answer to the 
abovementioned question: All of the respondents clearly mentioned that new additions or 
changes to the current board are an attempt to attain something they, in their current 
constellation, do not have access to or have not allocated. In order to achieve certain goals, the 
company needs to acquire the right sort of and complementary skills, experiences, resources 
et cetera that individuals outside the company’s walls or in the latter’s peripheral external 
environment possess, to the, already existing pool of traits. Thus, we yet again emphasize the 
legitimacy and relevance of Resource Dependence Theory in the USO setting as its 
applicability permeates our respondents’ accounts. 
The recruitment of new personnel to the board seems to be closely linked to Social Network 
Theory.  Some patterns can be discerned, exempli gratia, that these individuals are usually 
found through the own social networks within the company’s walls. The respondents clearly 
provide indications that align with the stipulations provided by SNT.  
2. From our study there is no decisive evidence that suggests or correlates with our above 
mentioned research question. In theory, the models are simplified versions of reality. Due to 
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their simplified nature and limited scope, it is logical to argue that its applicability must be, to 
some extent, constrained. We can concur with the fact that the life-cycle model holds 
underlying truths and postulations. However, our respondents do not give any clear evidence 
that strengthen the model enough to confirm one hundred percent validity in a practical 
setting. What we can underline in our study is that companies do change its board 
composition, due to changes that occur over time, but in black and white and in reality, it is 
not that simple.  It is naïve to rectify and rationally support a notion that suggests that all 
companies in an USO setting follow the same trajectory of development and thus, would 
encounter the exact same challenges at a fixed place in along the time axis. It is however 
logical to argue that similar encounter would occur, but yet again the time-parameter is 
elusive to elucidate when discerning patterns between the dyadic relationship of a theorized 
models and practical reality.   
Digressing from the research questions, after concluding the juxtaposing process between the 
empirical data and the theoretical facets incorporated within our research model, we argue 
that the latter fulfills its purpose and thus is applicable when studying USO’s in a Swedish 
context. Elaborating on the latter, we subsequently elucidated that the facets proposed within 
the model are of valid character, when applied in cases similar to this study’s. All of our 
respondents more or less gave answers that, to large extents, were relevant in regard to the 
facets, regardless of whether they concurred or digressed from the facet’s stipulation.  
However, as previously argued, some of the implied proposals by the model, such as the time-
parameter, would need some more empirical support to be able to credit it vigorously.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to test the model’s applicability in several other contexts, 
this to broaden the model’s spectra and provide more account along its continuum of results; 
as we inhabit a planet characterized by ever-increasing inter-connectivity and globalization 
we support the interest of multi-contextual appliance.  
6.2 Managerial Implications 
Our study elucidates the precursors involved in the process of board formation and 
composition in the USO setting. We argue the aforementioned findings delineated throughout 
this study is of essence for management and potential spin-off entrepreneurs to acknowledge, 
this as they constitute a platform where they can, in a self-reflexive manner, be aware of what 
factors, actually are active in the board formation, as impede hindsight reflections and other 
perceptions of retrospective nature. We have emphatically turned our peripheral eyes towards 
different theories in order to improve our eye’s focus. The foci of Resource Dependence, 
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Social Network and our research model we argue have been of great salience in this process, 
an yet again argue, as a conclusive remark, that the same can be accomplished for our focus 
group readers. Within both theoretical and practical communities the aforementioned 
elaborated theories are not of unknown character, however as the dominance of agency theory 
still prevails and, to a large extent, clouds the sky of corporate governance studies, we sincere 
optimism hope that new insights have been shed upon the conundrum, which might aid our 
future individuals operating within the USO setting as we argue scientia potentia est.  
6.3 Future Research 
We have snared our attentive eyes towards the phenomenon of USO board formation and 
composition in a Swedish context and have come to the conclusion that they are heavily 
influenced by Resource Dependency Theory and Social Network Theory, which we, Ex Ante, 
anticipated and therefore added in our now-proven-to-be relevant research model.  An 
exemplary and complimentary alternative approach for future research regarding our topic is 
to opt for a longitudinal study. We exclaim that this would certainly help in painting the 
picture of the conundrum as it entails other insights that might shed some light, we might have 
left reluctantly in the shadows. Furthermore opting for a quantitative methodology, instead of 
a qualitative one which we embraced, would irrefutably blend perfectly with our qualitative 
findings, creating a symbiosis that ultimately constitutes a foundation from where new 
patterns can be drawn from. Furthermore, opting to use alternative theories or even 
geographical locations might be an area containing possibilities as this field of research 
transcends boarders of paradigms and into the future. Overall, we digress from viewing this 
field of research as saturated. Au contraire we see it as both lucrative and thought-provoking, 
and as it is under-researched, the possibilities are endless, and therefore we urge future 
researchers to find alternative endeavors and thought-provoking angles to dissect the field and 
accentuate new findings.  
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Interview Guide 
Grundläggande: 
Vad heter du? 
Vart och vad jobbar du med nu? 
Hur ser din vardag ut, på ett ungefär? 
Berätta om organisationen? 
Teoretiskt förankrat: 
I vilket skede bildades er första styrelse, vilka var med och varför just dessa personer? 
Har styrelsesammansättningen ändrats? Och i så fall, Vem/varför/hur? 
Hur många ändringar, och när? 
Fanns det någon speciell anledning till att styrelsens sammansättning ändrades? 
Har sociala nätverk och gemenskapskretsar spelat en större roll vid ändringar? 
Vem blir oftast styrelseordförande? Ändringar? 
Värvas flest nya medlemmar från hans kontaktnät? 
Venture-Capital eller Encubator i styrelsen? Hur stort inflytande har han då? 
Är du inte rädd att VC gör beslut som gynnar dem i deras portfölj men inte ”ditt företag”? 
Kan du nämna några kritiska tillfällen där förändring i styrelsen sker? (exempel) 
 
